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Thomas: Schools and School Officials--Liability to Students for Civil Rig

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL OFFICIALS-

LIABILITY TO STUDENTS FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Two 16 year old high school students violated a school rule
prohibiting the use of intoxicating beverages at school sponsored
activities. The students had been assigned the responsibility of
making a punch to be served at an extracurricular school organization activity attended by parents and students. The plaintiffs
"spiked" the punch with two 12 ounce bottles of a malt liquor. The
fact that the punch was "spiked" went unnoticed at the school
function, but the violation was later revealed and prompted the
principal to suspend the students. The principal's action was reviewed and affirmed by the school board and the plaintiffs filed
suit against school board officials and school administrators of the
Special School District of Mena, Arkansas. Asserting a cause of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983' of the Civil Rights Act, the students
alleged a violation of their fourteenth amendment due process
rights, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas declared a mistrial and directed a verdict for defendants, reasoning that school officials were
immune from damage suits absent a showing of malice toward the
students. 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and awarded a new trial on the issue of damages.3
The defendant school officials appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Held: Affirmed.4 A school board member will be
liable for damages for the deprivation of a student's constitutional
right, where the educator knew or reasonably should have known
that his action violated the right, or where he acted with a mali42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2 Strickland v. Inlow, 348 F. Supp. 244, 250 (W.D. Ark. 1972).
Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 191 (8th Cir. 1973).
1 The Court stated, "[wie essentially sustain the position of the Court of
Appeals with respect to the immunity issue." Wood v. Strickland, 95 S.Ct. 992,
997 (1975). The actual judgment, however, was vacated and remanded. Concerning
the issue of procedural due process the court held that since "the District Court
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cious intention to violate the right.5 Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct.
992 (1975).
The defendants in Wood had argued that public school
officials should be absolutely immune from damage suits.' The
court found that teachers enjoy a "good faith" immunity from
damage suits' while performing their duties in the schools. In regard to absolute immunity, however, the court held that absolute
immunity is neither necessary nor justified "since it would not
sufficiently increase the ability of school officials to exercise their
discretion in a forthright manner to warrant the absence of a remedy for students ... -" Thus, educators must be prepared to bear
the risks of judicially imposed liability when their actions threaten
to violate the constitutional rights of students.'
did not discuss it, and the Court of Appeals did not decide it, it would be preferable
to have the Court of Appeals consider the issue in the first instance." Id. at 1003.
Justice White, speaking for the Court, stated:
[In the specific context of school discipline, we hold that a school board
member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew
or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his
sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of
the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student.
95 S. Ct. at 1001.
I Wood v. Strickland, 95 S.Ct. 992, 997 (1975). Absolute immunity from damage suits under § 1983 has previously been extended to certain public officials and
political subdivisions. The common law rule of absolute judicial immunity still
applies under § 1983, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). In addition immunity
has been extended to certain "quasi-judicial" actions, Robichaud v. Ronan, 351
F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965). States and municipalities are usually held absolutely
immune from § 1983 suits, e.g. Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir.
1970). Contra, McArthur v. Pennington, 253 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), holding that a township may be liable up to the limits of its insurance policy. School
districts have also been held immune, e.g., Rainey v. Jackson State College, 481
F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1973).
1 95 S.Ct. at 1001. For the policeman who makes an arrest in good faith and
with probable cause, the common law recognizes an immunity from damages for
false arrest. In an action for damages for false arrest brought under § 1983 the
Supreme Court stated that the reasons behind the common law rule would also
"seem to require excusing [the policeman] from liability for acting under a statute
that he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held unconstitutional,
on its face or as applied," Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). From this
common law tradition a qualified good faith immunity from damage suits under §
1983 has been extended to other public officials. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974), the chief executive officer of a state, the senior officers of the state's
National Guard, and the president of a state-controlled university were found to
enjoy a "good faith" immunity.
Wood v. Strickland, 95 S.Ct. 992, 999 (1975).
The impact of this decision on the daily affairs of the public school is difficult
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The implication of the Wood decision for school officials is
clear. Any transgressions of a student's constitutional rights may
result in an action for monetary damages. It is therefore imperative
that school officials know and understand those constitutional
rights which have been extended to students in recent years."
Among those rights of students recently recognized by the
Supreme Court is the first amendment right of free speech. In
Tinker v. Des Moines School District," the plaintiffs were expelled
from school for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam
War. However, this "speech" was held protected by the Supreme
Court where it did not "materially and substantially interfere with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school."'' 2 Subject to these same interests of discipline and the
orderly operation of the school, the Supreme Court has also held
that students have certain procedural due process rights in school
disciplinary procedure where the student is threatened with a suspension. A recent Fifth Circuit decision has also implied that the
eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is applicable to the public school system. 4 There is currently
considerable doubt as to what fourth amendment rights are applicable to public school students. 0
to foresee. A case decided one month earlier held that students are entitled to
protection under the due process clause, Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975). Goss
arose out of a period of widespread unrest in the Columbus, Ohio, school system in
early 1971. The nine students involved in the suit were all suspended without a
hearing. The reason for the suspensions was said to be disruptive and disobedient
conduct that occurred at demonstrations which took place in several schools. Personal assaults and damage to school property were involved in some of the protests.
Considered jointly Goss and Wood promise to substantially alter disciplinary procedures in an already turbulent public school system. For a further discussion of the
impact of these decisions on public schools see Note, ConstitutionalLaw-The
Childrens Crusadefor ConstitutionalRecognition, 78 W. VA. L. REv. (1976).
,0For a complete discussion of which constitutional rights of students have
been recognized, see Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L.
REv. 1045 (1968); Note, ConstitutionalRights of High School Students, 23 DRAKE
L. REv. 403 (1974).

11393 U.S. 503 (1969).
12 Id. at 509, citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
' Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975). For the facts of Goss see n.9 supra.
" Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974). The importance of this
decision with regard to damages is limited, however, since recoveries from teachers
for injuries caused by excessive corporal punishment have traditionally been allowed through common law tort actions, e.g., Melen v. McLaughlin, 107 Vt. 111,
176 A. 297 (1935). For a discussion of the constitutional implications of corporal
punishment in the schools, see n.22 infra.
11The courts have uniformly held that s6hool officials may make a warrentless
search of a student's locker, including items within the locker such as coats and
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Bearing the risk of liability, educators must also be concerned
with those elements of pecuniary damages available in civil rights
suits, and the potential for such damages in suits arising out of
conflicts in the public school system.
Traditionally the injunction has been the most popular and
effective remedy available for the redress of violations of constitutional rights." Within the context of public schools, injunctions
have been obtained by teachers'7 and students'" alike. However,
handbags. The leading case in this area is People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229
N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22"(1967), vacated per curiam, 393 U.S. 85 (1968), aff'd
on rehearing, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969). Various
reasons have been found to justify the refusal to recognize a fourth amendment
privilege in a locker search. With the theme of in loco parentis in the background,
Overton advances the hypothesis that a school official may consent to the search
of a student's locker. This approach is based upon a property concept which presumes that school officials are trustees for the public of all school property; they
therefore have an interest in school property superior to any private interest that
an individual student might possess. A few cases have held that a search has
violated a student's fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and
seizures. One situation is where police search a college dorm room with neither a
warrant nor probable cause. Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624 (MD. Ala.
1970), aff'd 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971). But see Moore v. Student Affairs Comm'n,
284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968), where a dorm search at the same college with
no police officers involved was found to be both reasonable and supported by
probable cause. Another finding that a search was illegal was reached in People v.
Bowers, 72 Misc. 2d 800, 339 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1973), where a high school student was
confronted and searched by a uniform security guard while on school property but
outside the school building. For a thorough examination of this subject, see Frels,
Search and Seizure in the Public Schools, 11 HOUSTON L. REV. 876 (1974); Buss,
The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IowA L.
REV. 739 (1974).
,1 It is the function of § 1983 to provide a remedy, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the court to fashion a remedy appropriate to the particular controversy, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1945). In those
situations where the plaintiff is threatened with the ongoing harm that flows from
the deprivation of a constitutional right, the injunction is an appropriate remedy.
The Supreme Court has recently increased the availability of injunctions in § 1983
suits by holding that actions may be brought under that statute to enjoin proceedings in state courts. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 255 (1972). The court determined
that suits under the Civil Rights Act are specific exceptions to the federal antiinjunction statute, 28 U.S.C. 2283 (19,18).
"7In Rainey v. Jackson State College, 481 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1973), plaintiff
obtained an injunction reinstating him in his teaching position at the college.
Rainey's contract had been withdrawn after the college discovered that he had
appeared as an expert witness for a defendant in an obscenity trial. The obscenity
trial had been held in a distant city the year before, and Rainey had received a great
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recent suits are placing greater emphasis on the element of money
damages. Nominal damages have frequently been awarded, 9 and
several cases have allowed attorney fees.2" But the potential limits
of liability in this area have yet to be explored.
The largest monetary awards obtained to date in suits brought
under § 1983 have occurred in those instances where a law officer
has severely injured the plaintiff in a situation where there was
clearly no need for excessive force.2 The unreasonable use of excessive force is a violation of fourteenth amendment due process
rights. Other than instances of excessive corporal punishment, " it
deal of publicity for his appearance. As a result of that publicity he had not been
granted tenure at the private school where he was teaching at that time.
18Injunctions preventing suspension from school were granted in Wood v.
Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975); and Tinker v.
Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Warren v. National Association
of Secondary School Principals, 375 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D. Tex. 1974), an injunction
was obtained to prevent plaintiff's dismissal from the National Honor Society. Also,
a great deal of litigation exists challenging suspensions where male students have
refused to cut their hair to conform with the requirements of the school they attend.
The school's requirement has been upheld where there is a showing that the long
hair interfered with the ordered discipline necessary for the proper functioning of
the school. Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970). However, injunctions
have been granted in Cardova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Ohio 1970), and
Lambert v. Marushi, 322 F. Supp. 326 (S.D. W. Va. 1971). The Lambert court held
that the school had failed to show that the student's long hair style created any
discipline problems.
11Nominal damages in § 1983 suits are automatically proved upon a showing
by plaintiff that his constitutional rights were violated. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d
74 (3d Cir. 1965). Contra, Joseph v. Rowlen, 425 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1970), a false
arrest case which held that a verdict assessing damages at $0.00 is valid. The court
stated that an award of at least nominal damages is not required. In Cardova v.
Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Ohio 1970), a high school student who had been
suspended for refusing to cut his hair was awarded nominal damages of $0.01. The
district judge reasoned that the student had not "been annoyed or humiliated
beyond what is usual in the course of a child's growth, and may, in fact have been
made a hero by some." Id. at 964.
"' Rainey v. Jackson State College, 481 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1973); Warren v.
National Association of Secondary School Principals, 375 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D. Tex.
1974).
21 Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1972); Gaston v. Gibson, 328 F.
Supp. 3 (E.D.Tenn. 1969), allowing a recovery of $40,000 upon proof of only $736.60
actual medical damages incurred by the time of trial.
" Tort claims involving corporal punishment inflicted by school officials have
been pursued in traditional common law forums until recently. One of the first
statements of the constitutional implications of this disciplinary practice is found
in Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 (D. Vt. 1973), stating that "[w]hile under
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is difficult to envision instances in the public school system where
large damage awards would be recovered based upon bodily injury.
Mental anguish, frequently referred to as "indignity and humiliation," and harm to reputation, are closely related areas where
monetary awards to students are most likely to increase. These are
traditional elements of tort damages, and awards have been made
for these types of damages in civil rights actions occurring in contexts other than the public school. In McArthur v. Pennington,23
plaintiffs were awarded damages for humiliation and harm to reputation. Although the court's opinion refers to some harm done to
plaintiffs' reputations, 1 there is no reference to what proof was
offered to demonstrate that harm, nor does the court specify how
much of the $5,100 award to each plaintiff is attributable to damage done to his reputation. From this case one might argue that
harm to reputation is a natural result of subjecting a person to
indignity and humiliation. An award for humiliation may be obtained without any showing of actual damages, 25 and in some situasome circumstances gratuitous assault by a person acting under color of state law
may entail a violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process... the use of moderate force may be sanctioned to secure important state interests." Id. at 369. The
court also determined that no formal hearing is required where the discipline is
necessary to secure obedience or maintain order. This latter holding, however, was
clearly overruled by Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 44 U.S.L.W. 3235 (1975). While leaving open the question of whether
the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is applicable
to school disciplinary proceedings, the district court held that a school official may
corporally punish a student over his parent's objection. The punishment may be
justified by showing the furtherance of a legitimate state interest, in this case, the
ordered discipline necessary in the school environment. The force used by the
teacher, however, must be reasonable. Citing Goss v.Lopez, the court held that
certain procedural safeguards were constitutionally required, the main element of
which was the presence of a second teacher during the infliction of the punishment.
1 253 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Tenn. 1963). This case involves the arrests of two
truck drivers in the middle of the night by an officer of the City of Loudon, Tennessee. The plaintiffs, who are brothers, were travelling together but in different
trucks, and the arrests were alleged to have been the result of a traffic violation.
The incident involved numerous constitutional violations including the use of excessive force in accomplishing the arrests, unreasonable search and seizure, and
denying the drivers an opportunity to contact counsel when requested.
24

Id. at 430.

Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (D. Id. 1962). Here, the plaintiff, a
female Indian, was awarded $500 for a false arrest where there was strong evidence
of malicious intent on the part of the arresting officer, but no showing of actual
damages.
2
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tions such an award is recoverable even where there is no showing
of defendant's malice."
Punitive damages are also recoverable in civil rights actions.2
Since the purpose of punitive damages is to impose pecuniary
punishment upon the defendant in order to deter him and others
from taking prohibited actions in the future, the question of when
to award punitive damages necessarily involves an evaluation of
the defendant's conduct. 28 A showing of defendant's bad faith is
normally required of the plaintiff.29 The main argument against
allowing punitive damages in § 1983 cases is that the potential for
excessive liability will deter responsible citizens from seeking public jobs, 0 since all recoveries under the statute are personal in
nature. Although punitive damages have been sought in some civil
rights suits arising out of violation of constitutional rights in the
public schools, there is presently no case where such an award has
been recovered.
Most monetary awards obtained by students have been compensatory in nature. In one district court case, two college students
recovered attorney fees and $100 each for the loss of class time and
resultant interruption of their education occasioned by an unconstitutional suspension." Since the Supreme Court has held that a
student possesses a property interest in his education, 2 an unconstitutional deprivation of the student's right to attend classeseven for just a day or two-would arguably result in a pecuniary
loss to the student equal to the value of the education he was
26 Solomon v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 96 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). A train
conductor asked a negro woman to move from the seat she had purchased into a
segregated coach of inferior quality. The request was based upon a company regulation and the conductor's actions appeared to satisfy a "good faith" standard, but
the plaintiff was successful and recovered a $500 award. Note, however, that this
case involved an action against a private party. The court based its holding upon
the Interstate Commerce Act rather than § 1983. For a similar case asserting a cause
of action under § 1983, see Fleming v. South Carolina Elec. and Gas Co., 224 F.2d
752 (4th Cir. 1955).
1 Hague v. Comm. on Indus. Planning, 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939), modified
on other grounds, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
21 Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974).
22 Motley v. Rundle, 340 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Trustees for State College of Conn., 474 F.2d
485 (2d Cir. 1973).
' Thonen v. Jenkins, 374 F. Supp. 134 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
32 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 735 (1975).
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denied. In this situation, a per diem argument
of the value of a day
3
of classroom instruction might be used. 1
Attorney fees is that element of compensatory damages which
students have most often recovered. This award is generally within
the discretion of the trial court, but the question of when attorney
fees should be awarded in civil rights cases is still very much a
topic of debate. A finding that the defendant's conduct was obdurate and obstinate is the standard most frequently applied when a
plaintiff is awarded counsel fees." One case has listed three situations where the recovery of attorney fees by a successful plaintiff
would be proper. These are when: (1) the defendants's behavior
has been obdurate, (2) the defendant has acted in bad faith, or (3)
the plaintiff has served the function of a private attorney general. 5
This list should probably not be considered exhaustive. One frequently quoted opinion notes that "[tihere is ample authority
• . . to support the proposition that the allowance of attorney's
fees and expenses of preparation for trial is in the descretion of the
district court sitting in equity where exceptional circumstances
3
call for their allowance in order to do justice between the parties."
"Exceptional circumstances" might include situations where there
is a gross difference between the relative financial positions of the
parties," or where the costs of litigation far exceed the actual damages involved. Here the important element is the nature of the
interest sought to be protected. With this reasoning, the award of
counsel fees need not necessarily depend upon any showing of the
defendant's bad faith or malice.
Wood v. Strickland and the foregoing discussion of damages
recoverable in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reveal that
the personal liability of public school teachers and school officials
for depriving students of their constitutional rights is expanding.
The limits of this liability are still unknown, though the potential
for large monetary awards to students does exist. An illustration
of that potential may be seen in Warren v. National Association
31 A per diem argument in a § 1983 action has been allowed in Sostre v.
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972), cert.
denied 405 U.S. 978 (1972). There the plaintiff prisoner was wrongfully subjected
to solitary confinement, and a recovery of $25 per day was allowed.
E.g., Thonen v. Jenkins, 374 F. Supp. 134 (D.N.D. 1974).
Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585 (D. Minn. 1973).
:' Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 1970).
:' Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475, 483 (7th Cir. 1972).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol78/iss2/8

8

Thomas: Schools and
School
Officials--Liability to Students for Civil Rig
CASE
COMMENTS
of Secondary School Principals.38 Warren, a seventeen year old
high school student was observed drinking beer at a local pizza
parlor by a teacher from his school. The teacher believed that
Warren had acted with the intention of affronting her in the presence of her date. Warren was an excellent student, the quarterback
for the high school football team and a member of the National
Honor Society. Since the teacher was on the faculty committee
overseeing the Honor Society and believed that drinking beer was
a violation of the moral standards of that organization, she sought
to have him dismissed from the group. Plaintiffs due process
rights were violated in the course of this dismissal and he sought
3
and obtained an order enjoining his dismissal. 1
On the basis of these facts, Warren already had strong arguments for a monetary recovery for attorney fees, humiliation, and
perhaps punitive damages. However, in a situation such as this, if
the plaintiff should subsequently lose an athletic or scholastic
scholarship to the college he desired to attend as a result of the
teacher's actions, the amount of damages could increase substantially. Indeed the effects on the student of such an incident might
last for years. Presumably the school teacher would be liable for
any resultant damages.
For obvious policy reasons, it is doubtful that the courts will
permit the school teacher's liability to expand to the extreme
amounts mentioned above. In the school environment of ordered
discipline, the teacher must possess the ability to act quickly and
affirmatively in a wide variety of situations. However, the courts
have now placed and will continue to place greater duties upon
teachers to know and observe the constitutional rights of their
charges. Such knowledge will be necessary for the teacher's own
protection against liability.
Darwin Thomas
" 375 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
" Id. at 1045.
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